Chapter Three - Definitions

Question

Chapter 3: (A) DEFINITIONS

Answer

Please explain the meaning of the following terms, providing examples wherever appropriate.

(1) Statutory interpretation

This is the process or method by which judges interpret statutory provisions relevant to the determination of cases brought before them. For example, a case might be brought to court to determine whether a licence is required for a certain activity and the judges would have to consult, and interpret, the relevant licensing legislation.

(2) Drafting

This refers to the way in which statutes have been prepared, written and structured. Traditionally, statutes were drafted in such a way as to cover every contingency, but a broader style of drafting can now be discerned. It is an important consideration in statutory interpretation since drafting that attempts to cover every contingency will lend its self to formal, word-for-word (literal) interpretation, whereas a broader approach allows for greater discretion to be exercised by judges.

(3) Teleological approach

This is the continental approach to interpretation that has been adopted in European law and has influenced the acceptance of a purposive approach to interpretation in English law. It looks to the purpose or intent of the law, rather than strict, formal meanings of words. Therefore, it attempts to reflect the spirit of the law rather than its precise written form.

(4) Ejusdem generic

This is a rule of language employed by the courts when a situation arises that may not have been foreseen when the statute was being drafted. It will bring within the meaning of the statute things that are of the ‘same class’ or ‘genus’ as those mentioned within the statute itself. Thus, if specific items are listed, plus a general term (for example, ‘houses, offices, rooms or other places’), the general term of ‘other places’ will include things only of the same class as the specific list, in this case indoor places. (See AS Level Law at pp 43-44 and consider Re Stockport Ragged, Industrial and Reformatory Schools (1898).)

(5) Exclusionary rule

This refers to the historical rule forbidding parliamentary use of a wide range of extrinsic aids to interpretation. The exclusionary rule was notably relaxed in the landmark case of Pepper v Hart (1993), thus allowing for Hansard (the official record of Parliamentary debates) to be consulted by judges seeking to discern the purpose or intent of the relevant legislation.

(6) Noscitur a sociis

This is a rule of language that means that the words of a statute should be construed according to the company they keep, or in other words, their context within the Act. To determine the meaning of one word, other accompanying words and sections must be considered. (See, for example, the case of Muir v Keay (1875) in AS Level Law at p 43.)

(7) Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

A simple translation is that the expression of one thing means the exclusion of another. This rule of language will look at the specific words in a statute and presume that they reflect Parliament’s intention in full: what has not been said by Parliament should not have significance or effect. Thus if a statute says that it applies to members of the armed forces, it would be taken as read that the statute did not refer to any other public services. (See AS Level Law’ at p 43 and the case of R v Inhabitants of Sedgley (1831).)

(8) Interpretation Act 1978

This Act of Parliament was passed in order to assist judges in the role of statutory interpretation and forms part of what might be referred to as the ‘statutory rules of interpretation’ (the other part being the interpretation, or definition, sections within statutes passed by Parliament). The Interpretation Act provides only limited assistance to judges, such as taking the word ‘he’ in an Act to also denote ‘she’.

(9) Parliamentary sovereignty

This is the constitutional doctrine that asserts Parliament’s law-making supremacy. This means that, in theory, the judges are subordinate to parliament and therefore they must apply and interpret law, rather than create it. In practice, however, parliamentary sovereignty has been diluted by European law developments and it has also been recognised that judges do make and shape the law. The opportunity to interpret statutes creatively – and critically – has been provided by the Human Rights Act 1998 in order to fulfil the UK’s partial incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights.

(10) Hansard

This is the official written record of what is said each day in Parliament, containing speeches, questions and entire debates. It has been allowed as an extrinsic aid of statutory interpretation, to be used by judges, ever since the House of Lords’ decision in the landmark case of Pepper v Hart (1993).